Abstract: In light of the limited consideration given by current research to the influence of retailer overconfidence behavior and government subsidies on dual-channel green supply chain decision-making, a two-stage benchmark model of dual-channel green supply chain dominated by manufacturers was constructed based on Stackelberg game model. Then, considering the presence or absence of government subsidies to manufacturers and the overconfidence behavior of retailers, an improved two-stage model and a three-stage model were constructed respectively, and the impacts of retailer overconfidence and government subsidies on the decision-making of supply chain members, their profits, and total social welfare were compared and analyzed. The results show that without government subsidies, as the overconfidence level of retailer overconfidence increases, product greenness, wholesale prices, online direct channel prices, and manufacturer profits decrease. The changes in offline retail channel prices and retailer profits also depend on direct channel market shares and product greening efficiencies. And that with government subsidies, the effects of retailer overconfidence on product greenness, online direct channel prices and offline retail channel prices, and total social welfare are partially offset.Therefore, government subsidies play a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of green supply chains, and in the process of government regulation of industry behavior and operational decision-making of upstream enterprises in the green supply chain, the risks that may arise from retailer overconfidence should be restricted.