Abstract: Taking IPO companies on SEM board and GEM board in Shenzhen from 2009 to 2020 as research samples, hand-collected venture capital exit data was used to empirically analyze the impact of state-owned and non-state-owned venture capital background on the exit timing, and the regulatory role of the implementation of new shareholding reduction rule and the reform of registration system. The heterogeneity of the regulatory effect from the perspective of the shareholding proportion of venture capital institutions and the equity concentration degree of entrepreneurial enterprises was analyzed.The results show that, compared to non-state-owned venture capital, state-owned venture capital exits later after the IPO. The implementation of the new shareholding reduction rule and the reform of the registration system promote the state-owned venture capital to exit later, and this promoting effect is more significant in the venture capital institutions with high shareholding ratio and the venture enterprises with low shareholding concentration. China’s state-owned venture capital institutions play an important role in promoting the orderly development of venture capital market. The implementation and improvement of government regulatory policies aimed at promoting the improvement of the capital market will promote the state-owned venture capital institutions to better play their policy mission role and enhance the vitality of the venture capital market. The government should actively play a regulatory role, address the impact of the rapid withdrawal of capital after the listing of enterprises in a targeted manner, alleviate the capital market “chaos”, maintain market order, and optimize resource allocation.