Abstract: Taking IPO companies on SEM board and GEM board in Shenzhen from 2009 to 2020 as research samples, hand-collected venture capital exit data was used to empirically analyze the impact of state-owned and non-state-owned venture capital background on the exit timing, and the regulatory role of the implementation of new shareholding reduction rule and the reform of registration system. The heterogeneity of the regulatory effect from the perspective of the shareholding proportion of venture capital institutions and the equity concentration degree of entrepreneurial enterprises was analyzed.The results show that compared with non-state-owned venture capital, state-owned venture capital exits portfolio companies later after IPO; the implementation ofthe new shareholding reduction rule and the registration-based IPO reform further strengthen this delayed exit effect of state-owned venture capital, with this effect being more pronounced among venture capital institutions with higher shareholding ratios and portfolio companies with lower ownership concentration. State-owned venture capital institutions play a crucial role in maintaining the stable development of the venture capital market, and the optimization of government regulatory policies aimed at improving the capital market can better leverage the policy-oriented function of state-owned venture capital institutions, thereby enhancing market vitality. Therefore, regulatory authorities need to implement targeted measures by establishing and improving differentiated exit mechanisms and information disclosure systems, which not only prevent the adverse impact of disorderly post-IPO capital exits on corporate operations but also effectively curb short-term arbitrage behaviors, thereby safeguarding market fairness and order while improving capital allocation efficiency.