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考虑平台奖惩机制的外卖骑手危险骑行行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Take-away Riders’ Risky Driving Considering Platform Incentive and Penalty Mechanisms

  • 摘要: 外卖骑手危险骑行导致道路交通事故频发。为深刻揭示骑手危险骑行行为决策的内在机制和演化规律,以美团外卖骑手为研究对象,构建外卖平台和骑手之间的演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体策略选择的稳定条件,并基于博弈模型的参数假设进行数值仿真分析,揭示平台绩效奖励和违规处罚对骑手危险骑行行为的动态影响机制。研究发现:平台绩效奖励显著影响骑手危险骑行策略选择,平台绩效奖励越高,骑手选择危险骑行的概率越高;平台的违规惩罚对约束骑手的危险骑行行为具有一定的抑制作用,合理的违规惩罚金额可以降低骑手选择危险骑行概率,但大幅度提高违规惩罚金额会导致骑手行为策略演化出现波动,并降低平台严格监管概率;降低监管成本可以有效提高平台严格监管意愿,从而提高骑手选择安全骑行的概率。因此外卖平台应设计基于配送效率和安全保障的多维度绩效奖励机制,引导和鼓励骑手严格遵守道路交通法规;合理调整违规惩罚额度,避免惩罚过重导致骑手选择报复性危险骑行行为的不理智行为;通过提高平台严格监管意愿和骑手危险骑行的感知成本,从而约束骑手更多地采取安全骑行策略。

     

    Abstract: Road accidents happened frequently due to the risky riding of take-away riders. In order to explore the complex mechanism and evolutionary trends of take-away riders' decision-making regarding risky riding behavior, taking Meituan take-away riders as the research object, an evolutionary game model of the platform and riders was constructed. The stability conditions of strategy selection for both game parties were systematically analyzed. Based on parameter assumptions of the game model, numerical simulation analysis was conducted to investigate the dynamic mechanisms of platform performance reward and violation penalty on take-away riders’ risky riding behaviors. The results show that the platform performance reward has a significant impact on take-away riders’ choice of risky riding behavior, higher performance rewards increase the probability of take-away riders’ choice of risky riding. Platform violation penalty has a certain inhibitory effect on restraining take-away riders' risky riding behavior. Setting reasonable violation penalty can reduce the probability of risky riding. However, a substantial increase in violation penalty amount may cause fluctuations in the evolution of risky riding behavior, and reduce the probability of strict supervisory by platform. Moreover, reducing regulatory costs can effectively increase the platform's willingness to enforce strict supervision, and improve the probability of take-away riders' choice of safe riding. Therefore, the platforms can design multi-dimensional performance reward mechanisms based on delivery efficiency and safety assurance to guide and encourage riders strictly complying with traffic regulations.By adjusting the severity of violation penalty, it can avoid irrational behaviors where take-away riders choose retaliatory dangerous riding due to excessive penalty. By increasing the platform's willingness to strictly supervise and the perceived cost of take-away riders' dangerous riding, the platform can constrain take-away riders to adopt more safe riding strategies.

     

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