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考虑平台奖惩机制的外卖骑手危险骑行行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Take-away Riders’ Risky Driving Considering Platform Incentive and Penalty Mechanisms

  • 摘要: 外卖骑手危险骑行导致道路交通事故频发,为深入揭示骑手危险骑行行为决策的内在机制和演化规律,以美团外卖骑手为研究对象,构建外卖平台和骑手之间的演化博弈模型,分析双方策略选择的稳定条件,并基于模型参数假设进行数值仿真,探讨平台绩效奖励和违规处罚对骑手危险骑行行为的动态影响机制。研究发现:平台绩效奖励显著影响骑手危险骑行策略选择,平台奖励水平越高,骑手选择危险骑行的概率越大;平台违规惩罚对骑手危险骑行行为具有一定抑制作用,合理设定违规惩罚金额可以降低骑手危险骑行的概率,但若惩罚金额大幅度提高,反而会导致骑手行为策略出现波动,并降低平台选择严格监管的概率;降低监管成本能够有效提高平台严格监管意愿,进而提高骑手选择安全骑行的概率。因此,外卖平台应构建基于配送效率和安全保障的多维度绩效奖励机制,引导骑手严格遵守交通法规;合理设定违规惩罚力度,避免因惩罚过重引发骑手报复性危险骑行行为;通过增强平台严格监管意愿与提高骑手危险骑行的感知成本,促使骑手更倾向于安全骑行策略。

     

    Abstract: Road accidents happened frequently due to the risky riding of take-away riders. In order to explore the complex mechanism and evolutionary trends of take-away riders’ decision-making regarding risky riding behavior, taking Meituan take-away riders as the research object, an evolutionary game model of the platform and riders was constructed. The stability conditions of strategy selection for both game parties were systematically analyzed. Based on parameter assumptions of the game model, numerical simulation analysis was conducted to investigate the dynamic mechanisms of platform performance reward and violation penalty on take-away riders’ risky riding behaviors. The results show that the platform performance reward has a significant impact on take-away riders’ choice of risky riding behavior, higher performance rewards increase the probability of take-away riders’ choice of risky riding. Platform violation penalty has a certain inhibitory effect on restraining take-away riders' risky riding behavior. Setting reasonable violation penalty can reduce the probability of risky riding. However, a substantial increase in violation penalty amount may cause fluctuations in the evolution of risky riding behavior, and reduce the probability of strict supervisory by platform. Moreover, reducing regulatory costs can effectively increase the platform's willingness to enforce strict supervision, and improve the probability of take-away riders’ choice of safe riding. Therefore, the platforms can design multi-dimensional performance reward mechanisms based on delivery efficiency and safety assurance to guide and encourage riders strictly complying with traffic regulations. By adjusting the severity of violation penalty, it can avoid irrational behaviors where take-away riders choose retaliatory dangerous riding due to excessive penalty. By increasing the platform’s willingness to strictly supervise and the perceived cost of take-away riders’ dangerous riding, the platform can constrain take-away riders to adopt more safe riding strategies.

     

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