Abstract: To promote sustainable growth and in-depth cross-border cooperation in the intelligent connected vehicle market, the dynamic risk preferences of enterprises were taken into account. A two-layer network model between new energy vehicle enterprises and technology enterprises was constructed. Evolutionary game theory and multi-dimensional simulation methods were applied to simulate and analyze the effects of key factors, including cooperative benefit distribution, speculative benefits, risk coefficient, and government subsidies, on the evolution of the cooperative R & D strategies of both parties. It is shown that the most significant negative effect on enterprises' cooperative willingness is exerted by the risk coefficient. A dominant position in cooperation is held by new energy vehicle enterprises, and their cooperative willingness is maintained even under a relatively low benefit distribution coefficient. Although non-cooperative behavior is induced by speculative benefits in the short term, the overall cooperation rate is eventually slightly enhanced by stable long-term return expectations.Significant heterogeneity is observed in the moderating effect of government subsidies. Technology enterprises are found to be more sensitive to subsidies, and greater fluctuation in their cooperative willingness is exhibited under low-subsidy scenarios. From the perspective of the combined mechanism, a stronger dominant effect is exerted by risk factors than by subsidies, and a significant positive moderating effect of government subsidies is only manifested under high-risk environments.Moreover, the driving force of cooperation is determined by enterprise strength differences. Technology breakthroughs are more relied upon by new energy vehicle enterprises, while policy support is more relied upon by technology enterprises. In this paper, the dynamic evolution mechanism of cross-border collaborative innovation in intelligent connected vehicles is revealed. A theoretical basis is provided for governments to formulate precise innovation incentive policies, and a practical reference is also offered for heterogeneous enterprises to make cooperative strategy choices in complex environments.