Abstract: In light of the limited consideration given by current research to the influence of retailer overconfidence behavior and government subsidies on the decision-making in a dual-channel green supply chain, a two-stage benchmark model for a manufacturer-led dual-channel green supply chain was constructed based on Stackelberg game model. This model was then refined into improved two-stage and three-stage models considering scenarios with and without government subsidies to manufacturers as well as the overconfidence behavior of retailers.The impacts of retailer overconfidence and government subsidies on the decisions, profits of supply chain members, and overall social welfare were compared and analyzed. The results show that without government subsidies, as the level of retailer overconfidence increases, the product’s greenness, wholesale price, direct online channel price, and manufacturer’s profit continuously decrease. Meanwhile, changes in the offline retail channel price and retailer’s profit also depend on the market share of the direct sales channel and the efficiency of product greening. When there are government subsidies, the effect of the retailer’s overconfidence on product’s greenness, direct online channel pricem, offline retail channel price, and total social welfare is partially offset.Government subsidies play a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of green supply chains. Both in regulating industry behavior and during the operational decision-making process of upstream enterprises in the green supply chain, the government should constrain the risks that may be caused by excessive retailer confidence..