Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Energy Industry Structural Transformation

The tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed by the government, the new energy industry and the traditional energy industry, and the evolution path and stability strategy of the three participants in the process of energy industry transformation were analyzed, and the behavioral strategy of the participants in the energy industry structural transformation and the important factors affecting the energy industry structural transformation were explored. The results show that there is a tripartite mutually beneficial evolutionary stability strategy, the evolutionary strategy of a single player is influenced by other players, and the new energy industry is more likely to be influenced by the willingness of government to participation than the traditional energy industry. Government subsidies are more sensitive to new energy enterprises, and excessive subsidies make traditional energy enterprises less willing to cooperate. Appropriately reduce the environmental tax on enterprises that choose to actively transform traditional energy, which is conducive to accelerating the process of bilateral cooperation. The improvement of the overall profitability of the energy industry can accelerate the structural transformation of the energy industry.